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relationship through agency, the functional equivalent of mandate.  Conversely, a number of 
allegedly “non-trust” jurisdictions indicate some acceptance of some kind of trust relation-
ship, even if the civil code does not expressly provide for it.
In many of the Civilian jurisdictions this trust relationship manifests itself in the form of an 
“evolving” or “non-codal” fi ducia – yet another indication of the “common core” that unites the 
trust and some Civilian institutions.
For this reviewer, coming as he does from a fellow mixed jurisdiction, George Gretton’s 
report on Scots law was of particular interest and value. It fi rst of all makes clear that such 
a system, where Civilian principles hold sway in many areas of the law, can indeed have a 
“proper” trust regime. Secondly, a comparison between the English and Scottish reports shows 
that effective solutions to trust problems can certainly be found without recourse to the “dual 
ownership” concept of English law. And in the third place it also illustrates how surprisingly 
similar are the basic structures of Scottish and South African trusts. The last point is even more 
remarkable when one considers that the two trust institutions have developed largely indepen-
dently from each other.
According to the editors’ account in the preface (at xv), it took seven years from the fi rst 
preliminary meeting where the project was conceived to the fi nal publication of the book. 
During these seven years there have been various meetings, discussions, workshops and refi ne-
ments before the fi nal product saw the light of day. Everyone interested in the law of trusts as 
an academic and practical subject – and indeed all comparative law scholars – owe the editors, 
national reporters and other contributors a debt of gratitude for their “long and thorough joint 
effort” (xvi). They have not only produced a mine of information and insights on the law of 
trusts, but they have also contributed signifi cantly towards the development of a “proper” Euro-
pean law of trusts.
Marius de Waal
University of Stellenbosch
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PROPERTIES OF LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF JIM HARRIS. Ed by Timothy Endi-
cott, Joshua Getzler and Edwin Peel.
Oxford: Oxford University Press (www.oup.com), 2006. xxiv + 388 pp. ISBN 099290962. £50.
As a teacher and as a scholar, the late Jim Harris inspired. His achievements humble. Few schol-
ars’ specialist subjects encompass so much. Harris’s distinguished contributions ranged across 
legal philosophy, private law and the role of precedent. Latterly, in what sadly proved to be his 
swansong (“Human Rights and Mythical Beasts” (2004) 120 LQR 428), he was the blind guide 
of the doctrinally blind, providing serious and discriminating analysis of the “rights” – some 
serious, others less so – freely and daily invoked.
This Festschrift in Harris’s honour contains eighteen contributions covering his four main 
areas of interest: legal philosophy, property theory, precedent, and human rights. The section 
on property might be of particular interest to readers of this Review. Civilians, it is said, are 
theoretical; common lawyers, practical. Not so with recent property law scholarship: Harris’s 
landmark Property and Justice (1996) is the triangulation point atop a mountain of Anglo-
American scholarship on the theory of property. Many of those scholars are here to pay homage. 
But having read – and enjoyed – these papers, this reviewer mused that Scots law, nonchalantly 
oblivious to such debates, appears none the worse for it. Civil lawyers, it seems, know what 
real rights are and recognise them when they see them. These papers may, however, provide 
helpful guidance when asking that very twenty-fi rst century question: is a right, whether real 
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or personal, “property” for human rights or constitutional purposes? One property paper is of 
particular importance: Tony Honoré’s “Marginal Comments” on his own classic 1961 article, 
“Property and Ownership” (in A G Guest (ed), Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence). Both papers 
by this great jurist are a must for Scots property lawyers. Despite the occasional bone of conten-
tion, Edwin Peel’s paper was very much to this reviewer’s taste: a critique of the application of 
international private law rules about land (preventing English courts from investigating title to 
foreign property) to foreign intellectual property rights.
In the two-paper section on precedent, Lionel Smith’s excellent paper on “Rationality of 
Tradition” grapples with the legal equivalent of the problem of induction, the stare decisis prin-
ciple. He argues that precedent is rational. And it might well be. But, as Sir Otto Kahn-Freund 
once pointed out, learning law in terms of precedent is as absurd as learning pathology in terms 
of the rarest diseases.
Perhaps the strongest part of the book is the fi nal section on human rights. There is a tangible 
sense of, what if Harris had been able to complete his project. Timothy Endicott’s “Infant in the 
Snow” pays Harris the ultimate scholarly compliment, standing, where strong, on the shoulders 
of his “Mythical Beasts” contribution; but providing penetrating criticism of the analysis where 
weak. The fi nal paper is the perfect conclusion, one for the connoisseur: a smouldering single 
malt, in vintage form. “Matter Matters” says Bernard Rudden. The modes of production have 
infl uenced legal change. No longer does the law strive to ensure a steady production of workers 
by criminalising homosexuality and preventing distractions from the female vocation of repeti-
tive child-bearing and rearing. Now there are no slaves. Homosexuality is a right. Children are 
a luxury for the wealthy. And animal welfare is more regulated than people welfare. Legally and 
culturally, we now treat children and animals in a similar way. “I have a T-shirt inscribed ‘Save 
the Badgers’”, Rudden ruminates, putting the bottle back in its case, “My oven glove says ‘Save 
the Children’”.
Ross Gilbert Anderson 
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Victor Tadros, CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press (www.oup.com), 2005. x + 389 pp. ISBN 0199261598. £50.
Criminal Responsibility is an account of the way in which the criminal law ought to hold people 
responsible for their conduct. It is divided into two parts. Part I is a normative account of what 
Tadros terms “the character of criminal responsibility”. In Part II, Tadros examines doctrines 
of criminal responsibility, including causation, justifi cation and excuse. The book’s overall argu-
ment is that the ascription of criminal responsibility should be dependent on the accused’s status 
as an agent. In Criminal Responsibility, Tadros delivers a sophisticated and well-developed 
thesis in support of this argument.
In Part I, Tadros develops an account of the character of criminal responsibility. He starts 
from the position that holding someone responsible under the criminal law is a “specifi c instance 
of the more general practice of holding agents responsible for what they do” (21). According 
to Tadros, holding an individual responsible involves reacting emotionally “in a particular way” 
to his or her behaviour, and means that we can demand that he or she account for his or her 
behaviour “in a particular way” (8). His account draws on the philosophical literature on respon-
sibility. The book provides a useful overview of the existing material. The technique of entering 
into dialogue with several theorists of criminal responsibility has the advantage of indicating 
clearly to the reader in which respects his account concords with others and in which respects 
it differs.
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